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 In different ATCA cases, different courts have applied international law, the law of the state where the underlying events occurred, or the law of the forum state, respectively. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 105 n.12 (2d Cir. 2000). Unocal urges us to apply not international law, but the law of the state where the underlying events occurred, i.e., Myanmar. Where, as in the present case, only jus cogens violations are alleged i.e., violations of norms of international law that are binding on nations even if they do not agree to them, see supra note 14 and accompanying text it may, however, be preferable to apply international law rather than the law of any particular state, such as the state where the underlying events occurred or the forum state.23 The reason is that, by definition, the law of any particular state is either identical to the jus cogens norms of international law, or it is invalid. Moreover, reading § 1350 as essentially a jurisdictional grant only and then looking to [foreign or] domestic tort law to provide the cause of action mutes the grave international law aspect of the tort, reducing it to no more (or less) than a garden-variety municipal tort, Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 183 (D. Mass. 1995), i.e., reducing it to a tort relating to the internal government of a state of nation (as contrasted with international), Blacks Law Dictionary 1037 (7th ed. 1999). Significantly, we have already held that the ATCA not only confers jurisdiction but also creates a cause of action. See Papa, 281 F.3d at 1013; Marcos II, 25 F.3d at 1474-75.
 Application of international law rather than the law of Myanmar, California state law, or our federal common law is also favored by a consideration of the factors listed in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6 (1969). First, the needs of the . . . international system[ ] are better served by applying international rather than national law. Second, the relevant policies of the forum cannot be ascertained by referring as the concurrence does to one outof-circuit decision which happens to favor federal common law and ignoring other decisions which have favored other law, including international law. See Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 105 n.12. Third, regarding the protection of justified expectations, the certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and the ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied, we note that the standard we adopt today from an admittedly recent case nevertheless goes back at least to the Nuremberg trials and is similar to that of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See infra note 26 and accompanying text.24 Finally, the basic polic[y] underlying the particular field of law is to provide tort remedies for violations of international law. This goal is furthered by the application of international law, even when the international law in question is criminal law but is similar to domestic tort law, as discussed in the next paragraph. We conclude that given the record in the present case, application of international law is appropriate.25
 International human rights law has been developed largely in the context of criminal prosecutions rather than civil proceedings. See Beth Stevens, Translating Filartiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 Yale J. Intl L. 1, 40 (2002). But what is a crime in one jurisdiction is often a tort in another jurisdiction, and this distinction is therefore of little help in ascertaining the standards of international human rights law. See id. at 44-46. Moreover, as mentioned above in note 23 and further discussed later in this section, the standard for aiding and abetting in international criminal law is similar to the standard for aiding and abetting in domestic tort law, making the distinction between criminal and tort law less crucial in this context. Accordingly, District Courts are increasingly turning to the decisions by international criminal tribunals for instructions regarding the standards of international human rights law under our civil ATCA. See, e.g., Cabello Barrueto v. Fernandez Larios, 205 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1333 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (concluding on the basis of, inter alia, the statute of and a decision by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia that defendants may be held liable under the ATCA for . . . aiding and abetting the actions taken by [foreign] military officials); Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (noting that among various contemporary sources for ascertaining the norms of international law as they pertain to the ATCA, the statutes of the [International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia] and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda . . . and recent opinions of these tribunals are particularly relevant). We agree with this approach. We find recent decisions by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda especially helpful for ascertaining the current standard for aiding and abetting under international law as it pertains to the ATCA.
In Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-T (Dec. 10, 1998), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 317 (1999), the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia held that the actus reus of aiding and abetting in international criminal law requires practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime. Id. at ¶ 235. The Tribunal clarified that in order to qualify, assistance need not constitute an indispensable element, that is, a condition sine qua non for the acts of the principal. Furundzija at ¶ 209; see also Prosecutor v. Kunarac, IT-96 -23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, ¶ 391 (Feb. 22, 2001), http://www.un.org/icty/foca/trialc2/judgement/index.htm (The act of assistance need not have caused the act of the principal.). Rather, it suffices that the acts of the accomplice make a significant difference to the commission of the criminal act by the principal. Furundzija at ¶ 233. The acts of the accomplice have the required [substantial] effect on the commission of the crime where the criminal act most probably would not have occurred in the same way [without] someone act[ing] in the role that the [accomplice] in fact assumed. Prosecutor v. Tadic, ICTY-94-1, ¶ 688 (May 7, 1997), http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/trials2/judgement/index.htm.26
Similarly, in Prosecutor v. Musema, ICTR-96-13-T (Jan. 27, 2000), http://www.ictr.org/, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda described the actus reus of aiding and abetting as all acts of assistance in the form of either physical or moral support that substantially contribute to the commission of the crime. Id. at ¶ 126.
As for the mens rea of aiding and abetting, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia held that what is required is actual or constructive (i.e., reasonabl[e]) knowledge that [the accomplices] actions will assist the perpetrator in the commission of the crime. Furundzija at ¶ 245. Thus, it is not necessary for the accomplice to share the mens rea of the perpetrator, in the sense of positive intention to commit the crime. Id. In fact, it is not even necessary that the aider and abettor knows the precise crime that the principal intends to commit. See id. Rather, if the accused is aware that one of a number of crimes will probably be committed, and one of those crimes is in fact committed, he has intended to facilitate the commission of that crime, and is guilty as an aider and abettor. Id.27
Similarly, for the mens rea of aiding and abetting, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda required that the accomplice knew of the assistance he was providing in the commission of the principal offence. Musema at ¶ 180. The accomplice does not have to have had the intent to commit the principal offense. See id. at ¶ 181. It is sufficient that the accomplice knew or had reason to know that the principal had the intent to commit the offense. Id. at ¶ 182.
 The Furundzija standard for aiding and abetting liability under international criminal law can be summarized as knowing practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime. At least with respect to assistance and encouragement, this standard is similar to the standard for aiding and abetting under domestic tort law. Thus, the Restatement of Torts states: For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he . . . (b) knows that the others conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself . . . . Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 (1979) (emphasis added). Especially given the similarities between the Furundzija international criminal standard and the Restatement domestic tort standard, we find that application of a slightly modified Furundzija standard is appropriate in the present case. In particular, given that there is as discussed below sufficient evidence in the present case that Unocal gave assistance and encouragement to the Myanmar Military, we do not need to decide whether it would have been enough if Unocal had only given moral support to the Myanmar Military. Accordingly, we may impose aiding and abetting liability for knowing practical assistance or encouragement which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime, leaving the question whether such liability should also be imposed for moral support which has the required substantial effect to another day.28
 First, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Unocals alleged conduct met the actus reus requirement of aiding and abetting as we define it today, i.e., practical assistance or encouragement which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime of, in the present case, forced labor.
 Unocals weak protestations notwithstanding, there is little doubt that the record contains substantial evidence creating a material question of fact as to whether forced labor was used in connection with the construction of the pipeline. Numerous witnesses, including a number of Plaintiffs, testified that they were forced to clear the right of way for the pipeline and to build helipads for the project before construction of the pipeline began. For instance, John Doe IX testified that he was forced to build a helipad near the pipeline site in 1994 that was then used by Unocal and Total officials who visited the pipeline during its planning stages. Other Plaintiffs and witnesses, including John Doe VII and John Roe X, described the construction of helipads at Eindayaza and Po Pah Pta, both of which were near the pipeline site, were used to ferry Total/Unocal executives and materials to the construction site, and were constructed using the forced labor of local villagers, including Plaintiffs. Other Plaintiffs, such as John Roes VIII and IX, as well as John Does I, VIII and IX, testified that they were forced to work on building roads leading to the pipeline construction area. Finally, yet other Plaintiffs, such as John Does V and IX, testified that they were required to serve as pipeline porters workers who performed menial tasks such as hauling materials and cleaning the army camps for the soldiers guarding the pipeline construction. These serious allegations create triable questions of fact as to whether the Myanmar Military implemented a policy of forced labor in connection with its work on the pipeline.
 The evidence also supports the conclusion that Unocal gave practical assistance to the Myanmar Military in subjecting Plaintiffs to forced labor.29 The practical assistance took the form of hiring the Myanmar Military to provide security and build infrastructure along the pipeline route in exchange for money or food. The practical assistance also took the form of using photos, surveys, and maps in daily meetings to show the Myanmar Military where to provide security and build infrastructure.
 This assistance, moreover, had a substantial effect on the perpetration of forced labor, which most probably would not have occurred in the same way without someone hiring the Myanmar Military to provide security, and without someone showing them where to do it. Tadic at ¶ 688. This conclusion is supported by the admission of Unocal Representative Robinson that [o]ur assertion that [the Myanmar Military] has not expanded and amplified its usual methods around the pipeline on our behalf may not withstand much scrutiny, and by the admission of Unocal President Imle that [i]f forced labor goes hand and glove with the military yes there will be more forced labor. (Emphasis added.)
23. Because the law of nations is part of federal common law, Marcos I, 978 F.2d at 502, the choice between international law and the law of the forum state, which in the present case is California state law or our federal common law, is less crucial than the choice between international law and the law of the state where the underlying events occurred, which in the present case is the law of Myanmar. Moreover, as discussed later in this section, the standard for aiding and abetting in international criminal law is similar to the standard for aiding and abetting in domestic tort law, making the choice between international and domestic law even less crucial.
24. Because moral support is not part of the standard we adopt today, the concurrences discussion in this context of the international law regarding third party moral support is beside the point. Concurrence at 14252, see infra note 28.
25. We stress that our conclusion that application of international law is appropriate is based on the record in this case. In other cases with different facts, application of the law of the forum state including federal common law or the law of the state where the events occurred may be appropriate.
26. The Furundzija Tribunal based its actus reus standard for aiding and abetting on an exhaustive analysis of international case law and international instruments. See id. at ¶¶ 192-234. The international case law it considered consisted chiefly of decisions by American and British military courts and tribunals dealing with Nazi war crimes, as well as German courts in the British and French occupied zones dealing with such crimes in the aftermath of the Second World War. See id. at ¶¶ 195-97. The international instruments consisted of the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind adopted by the United Nations International Law Commission in 1996, as well as the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court adopted by an overwhelming majority of the States attending the Rome Diplomatic Conference and . . . substantially endorsed by the General Assemblys Sixth Committee on 26 November 1998. Id. at 227. It is hard to argue with the Furundzija Tribunals reliance on these sources.
27. The Furundzija Tribunal based its mens rea standard for aiding and abetting on an analysis of the same international case law and international instruments mentioned above in note 26. See id. at ¶¶ 236-49. The Tribunals reliance on these sources again seems beyond reproach.
28. We note, however, that there may be no difference between encouragement and moral support. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 cmt. d (stating that encouragement to act operates as a moral support). The concurrence claims: Having declared . . . that the Yugoslav Tribunals standard constitutes the controlling international law, the majority cannot then escape the full implications of being bound by the law it has selected and has lost whatever opportunity it had to pick and chose the aspects of international law it finds appealing. Concurrence at 14256 n.9. But nowhere in this opinion have we declared that the Yugoslav Tribunals standard constitutes the controlling international law, id. (emphasis added), and as a result, we are also not bound by every aspect of that standard, the concurrences protestations notwithstanding. In fact, we have merely declared that [w]e find recent decisions by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda especially helpful for ascertaining the current standard for aiding and abetting under international law as it pertains to the ATCA. Supra at 14217. That is, we have done no more than declare that the decisions by these tribunals are one of the sources of international law, rather than the source of international law. Having done so, we then concluded that with respect to practical assistance and encouragement, these decisions accurately reflect the current standard for aiding and abetting under international law as it pertains to the ATCA, and have left open the question whether this is also true with respect to moral support. This procedure is not particularly noteworthy, let alone improper. And the concurrences repeated references to the Yugoslav Tribunals moral support standard, concurrence at 14255, 14256, are at best irrelevant and at worst intended to suggest that we, albeit unwittingly, adopted a standard which we, in fact, did not adopt, unwittingly or otherwise.
29. The evidence further supports the conclusion that Unocal gave encouragement to the Myanmar Military in subjecting Plaintiffs to forced labor. The daily meetings with the Myanmar Military to show it where to provide security and build infrastructure, despite Unocals knowledge that the Myanmar Military would probably use forced labor to provide these services, may have encouraged the Myanmar Military to actually use forced labor for the benefit of the Project. Similarly, the payments to the Myanmar Military for providing these services, despite Unocals knowledge that the Myanmar Military had actually used forced labor to provide them, may have encouraged the Myanmar Military to continue to use forced labor in connection with the Project.