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The problem with this reasoning is that neither Nelson, nor other case law, nor the legislative history of § 1605(a)(2) suggest that a foreign states conduct in connection with a commercial activity must itself be a commercial activity to fall within the third exception to foreign sovereign immunity. In other words, there is no support for the proposition that the foreign states conduct in connection with a commercial activity must be an exercise[ ] [of] only those powers that can also be exercised by private citizens to fall within the third exception in § 1605(a)(2). Nelson, 507 U.S. at 360. Rather, as the Supreme Court observed in Nelson, Congress manifestly understood there to be a difference between a suit based upon commercial activity and one based upon acts performed in connection with such activity. Id. at 358.
The District Court looked for support for its contrary conclusion in a different passage in Nelson, where the Supreme Court held that even if a foreign government often used detention and torture to resolve commercial disputes, this would not alter the fact that the powers allegedly abused where those of police and penal officers. Id. at 363. In that passage, however, Nelson held only that the use of detention and torture to resolve commercial disputes would not qualify as a commercial activity and, therefore, fall within the first exception to foreign sovereign immunity, which is not at issue here. See 507 U.S. at 356. But Nelson did not hold that such use of detention and torture also would not qualify as an act performed in connection with a commercial activity and, therefore, fall within the third exception to foreign sovereign immunity, which is at issue here.34
C. Plaintiffs claims against Unocal are not barred by the Act of State Doctrine.
Unocal also argues that Plaintiffs claims against it are barred by the act of state doctrine. The act of state doctrine is a non-jurisdictional, prudential doctrine based on the notion that the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another, done within its own territory. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). Act of state issues only arise when a court must decide that is, when the outcome of the case turns upon the effect of official action by a foreign sovereign. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Intl, 493 U.S. 400, 406 (1990). As long as this requirement is met, the act of state doctrine can be invoked by private parties such as Unocal. See, e.g., Credit Suisse v. United States Dist. Court, 130 F.3d 1342, 1348 (9th Cir. 1997). In the present case, an act of state issue arises because the court must decide that the conduct by the Myanmar Military violated international law in order to hold Unocal liable for aiding and abetting that conduct. We review the applicability of the act of state doctrine de novo. See Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1424 (9th Cir. 1989).
The Second Circuit has said that it would be a rare case in which the act of state doctrine precluded suit under [the ATCA]. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 250. We find that the present case is not that rare case, and that the act of state doctrine does not preclude suit under the ATCA here.
In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), the Supreme Court developed a three-factor balancing test to determine whether the act of state doctrine should apply:
 [T]he greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular area of international law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions regarding it . . . .  [T]he less important the implications of an issue are for our foreign relations, the weaker the justification for exclusivity in the political branches.  The balance of relevant considerations may also be shifted if the government which perpetrated the challenged act of state is no longer in existence . . . .
Id. at 428. We have added a fourth factor to this test:  [W]e must [also] consider . . . whether the foreign state was acting in the public interest. Liu, 892 F.2d at 1432. With the exception of the third factor, all of these factors weigh against application of the act of state doctrine in this case.
Regarding the first factor international consensus we have recognized that murder, torture, and slavery are jus cogens violations, i.e., violations of norms that are binding on nations even if they do not agree to them. See Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d at 764 n. 5; Siderman, 965 F.2d at 714-15. As discussed supra in section II.A.1., rape can be a form of torture and thus also a jus cogens violation. Similarly, as discussed supra in section II.A.2.a, forced labor is a modern form of slavery and thus likewise a jus cogens violation. Accordingly, all torts alleged in the present case are jus cogens violations. Because jus cogens violations are, by definition, internationally denounced, there is a high degree of international consensus against them, which severely undermines Unocals argument that the alleged acts by the Myanmar Military and Myanmar Oil should be treated as acts of state.
Regarding the second factor implications for our foreign relations the coordinate branches of our government have already denounced Myanmars human rights abuses and imposed sanctions. It is also worth noting that in 1997, the State Department advised the District Court that at this time adjudication of the claims based on allegations of torture and slavery would not prejudice or impede the conduct of U.S. foreign relations with the current government of Burma. Roe I, 176 F.R.D. at 362. This statement of interest at the dismissal stage is not conclusive at this later stage, especially in light of the fact that [t]he Executive Branch . . . cannot by simple stipulation change a political question into a cognizable claim. First Natl City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 788-89 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting). But the statement is also not irrelevant. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 594 F. Supp. 1553, 1563 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (stating that courts may, as a matter of discretion, accept the views of the State Department). We agree with the District Courts evaluation that [g]iven the circumstances of the instant case, and particularly the Statement of Interest of the United States, it is hard to imagine how judicial consideration of the matter will so substantially exacerbate relations with [the Myanmar Military] as to cause hostile confrontations. Roe I 176 F.R.D. at 354 n.29 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Regarding the third factor continued existence of the accused government the Myanmar Military is still the government of Myanmar, although it changed its full name from State Law and Order Restoration Council to State Peace and Development Council following the events at issue here. That a condemnation of the alleged acts may offend the current government of Myanmar is the only factor that weighs in favor of applying the act of state doctrine.
Finally, regarding the fourth factor that we have imposed public interest it would be difficult to contend that the Myanmar Military and Myanmar Oils alleged violations of international human rights were in the public interest. Indeed, the District Court found at the summary judgment stage that there is an issue of fact as to whether the forced labor was used to benefit the Project as opposed to the pub-lics welfare. Doe/Roe II, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1308. This genuine issue of material fact precludes summary judgment in favor of Unocal on this basis.
Because the four factor balancing test weighs against applying the act of state doctrine, we find that Plaintiffs claims are not barred by this doctrine.
D. The District Court lacked extraterritorial subject matter jurisdiction over the Doe-Plaintiffs RICO claim against Unocal.
The Doe-Plaintiffs allege that Unocals conduct violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. RICO makes it unlawful, inter alia, for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprises affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity, or to conspire in such conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c),(d). Racketeering activity is partially defined as any act which is indictable under any one of a number of listed provisions of Title 18 of the United States Code. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B). The Doe-Plaintiffs allege that Unocal engaged and conspired in a pattern of extortion that is indictable under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, one of the provisions enumerated in RICOs definition of racketeering activity. The Hobbs Act provides in relevant part:
Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion[,] or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section[,] shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).
The District Court granted Unocals motion for summary judgment on the Doe-Plaintiffs RICO claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We review the existence of subject matter jurisdiction under RICO de novo. See United States v. Juvenile Male, 118 F.3d 1344, 1346 (9th Cir. 1997).
The Doe-Plaintiffs base their underlying Hobbs Act claim on the alleged extortion of their labor. The Hobbs Act defines extortion as the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2). We have observed that [t]he concept of property under the Hobbs Act has not been limited to physical or tangible things. United States v. Zemek, 634 F.2d 1159, 1174 (9th Cir. 1980). Thus we have recognized the right . . . to solicit business free from wrongful coercion, id., and the right to make personal and business decisions about the purchase of life insurance on [ones] own life free of threats, United States v. Hoelker, 765 F.2d 1422, 1425 (9th Cir. 1985), as property rights that are protected by the Hobbs Act. More generally, the Second Circuit has held that [t]he concept of property under the Hobbs Act . . . includes, in a broad sense, any valuable right considered as a source or element of wealth. United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069, 1075 (2d Cir. 1969). The right to make personal and business decisions about ones own labor also fits this definition of property. Forced labor allegations can, therefore, form the basis of a Hobbs Act claim, and this claim can, in turn, form the basis of a RICO claim.
The District Court nevertheless correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Unocal on the Doe-Plaintiffs RICO claim for lack of extraterritorial subject matter jurisdiction. We agree with the Second Circuit that for RICO to apply extraterritorially, the claim must meet either the conduct or the effect test that courts have developed to determine jurisdiction in securities fraud cases. See North South Fin. Corp. v. Al-Turki, 100 F.3d 1046, 1051 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Butte Mining PLC v. Smith, 76 F.3d 287, 291 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding with respect to extraterritorial application of RICO that [o]nce the securities fraud claim was dismissed [for lack of extraterritorial subject matter jurisdiction under the conduct or the effect test,] the wire and mail fraud and RICO claims that related to this fraud had to be dismissed as well). The Doe-Plaintiffs do not challenge that they must meet one of these two test to succeed on their RICO claim. Instead, they challenge the District Courts conclusion that they cannot meet either test.
Under the conduct test, a district court has jurisdiction over securities fraud suits by foreigners who have lost money through sales abroad [o]nly where conduct within the United States directly caused the loss. Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041, 1046 (2d Cir. 1983) (emphasis added) (quoting Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir. 1975)). Mere preparatory activities, and conduct far removed from the consummation of the fraud, will not suffice to establish jurisdiction. Id. (emphasis added).
Under the effects test, [t]he anti-fraud laws of the United States may be given extraterritorial reach whenever a predominantly foreign transaction has substantial effects within the United States. Consol. Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 261-62 (2d Cir. 1989). This test is met where the domestic effect is a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside of the United States. Id. at 262 (emphasis added). By contrast, courts have been reluctant to apply our laws to transactions that have only remote and indirect effects in the United States. Id. (emphasis added).
The conduct and the effect test appear to be two sides of one coin. The conduct test establishes jurisdiction for domestic conduct that directly causes foreign loss or injury. Conversely, the effects test establishes jurisdiction for foreign conduct that directly causes domestic loss or injury. The conduct involved in this case does not meet either of these two tests.
The Doe-Plaintiffs allege that in furtherance of an unlawful conspiracy, Unocal transferred significant financial and technical support for Project activity from the United States to Myanmar. Under the conduct test, the question is whether this transfer from the United States directly caused loss or injury in Myanmar. We conclude that it did not. In Butte Mining, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants used domestic mail and wire to further a foreign securities fraud. 76 F.3d at 291. In that case, we found no reason to extend the jurisdictional scope of RICO to make criminal the use of the mail and wire in the United States as part of an alleged fraud outside the United States. Id. Similarly, in the present case, we find no reason to extend the jurisdictional scope of RICO to create civil liability for the transfer of monies and technical support from the United States as part of an alleged pattern of extortion outside the United States. We therefore hold that the Doe-Plaintiffs allegations do not satisfy the conduct test.
Nor have the Doe Plaintiffs pointed to any evidence that Unocals alleged conduct in Myanmar directly caused loss or injury in the United States and thus satisfied the effects test. If the party moving for summary judgment meets its initial burden of identifying for the court the portions of the materials on file that it believes demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact, . . . the nonmoving party may not rely on the mere allegations in the pleadings in order to preclude summary judgment, but instead must set forth . . . specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Assn, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The Doe-Plaintiffs assert in their Opening Brief that Unocals actions in Myanmar gave Unocal an unfair advantage over competitors in the United States. The Doe-Plaintiffs, however, do not point to any specific facts in the record to support these conclusory allegations, as they are required to do by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). These mere allegations are not enough to survive Unocals motion for summary judgment on the Doe-Plaintiffs RICO claim. We therefore hold that the Doe-Plaintiffs allegations also do not meet the effects test.
34. For the same reason, and contrary to the District Courts conclusion, Nelson also does not undermine our holding in Siderman, 965 F.2d 699, another case involving the third rather than the first exception in § 1605(a)(2).